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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
scripO 5 In reply to the due process argument, the Court treated the remedial
statute in question by stating that some type of notice, although not expressly
stated in the statute, was given to the county in the form of a hearing when
it moved to vacate that part of the order directing it to pay the costs of the minutes.
Upon the facts of the instant case, the Court could reasonably conclude that
there had been no deprivation of due process, but intimated that, had there been
no hearing as was accorded the county in its motion to vacate, or no notice given,
a county could effectively challenge the constitutionality of the section. Even then,
there would arise no substantial question until there had been a taking of property
in the. form of a payment by the county of public moneys. 46 In the case at hand,
the action of the county could properly be viewed as an acknowledgment that it
had notice of the claims of defendant-appellant and challenged the claim before
making any payment.
Per Curiam
Summary hdgment-The Court, in Friedman v. Marco,47 found enough questions of fact in the question of whether an agreement of sale violated the Insurance
Law, as to preclude granting summary judgment.
Administrative. Review-In Drew v. State Liquor Authority,4 the Court
refused to consider the effect of a Liquor Authority decision until another hearing,
ordered by the Appellate Division,40 had been held, in order to make further
findings in regard to the rescission of a grant of a liquor license.
Injunction-The Court sustained the reversal of Special Term, and grant of a
new trial, by the Appellate Division 0 in Kraus & Bros. v.Bergman,51 where
the trial judge had granted an injunction in a labor dispute without proof or
findings of fact in regard to damage.
Statute of Limitations-The Court determined, in McDermott v. Johnson,2
that section 1286 of the Civil Practice Act, which imposes a four month limitation
period on commencing actions against governmental officers upon refusal to
perform a duty, became effective upon the refusal of a superintendent of the
Department of Public Works to allow certain seasonal barge employees to return
to work.
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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
Grounds of Reversal-In In re Kassebohm's Estate,53 the Appellate Division5 4
had reversed the Surrogate's Court's finding, in relation to an inter vivos gift,
with the statement that the lower court's finding "staggers credulity."' 5 However
since the opinion did not state whether the reversal was on the facts or on the
law, the Court of Appeals was bound, under section 602 of the Civil Practice
Act to consider it as being on a question of law. Holding that there was some basis
of fact for the Surrogate's conclusion, thus precluding a reversal on the law, the
Court5 6 returned the case to the Appellate Division pursuant to section 606 of
the Civil Practice Act to allow it to make a determination of fact.
Representation by Attorney-In less than eighty words, the Court, in Oliner v.
Mid-Town Promoters,57 held section 236 of the Civil Practice Act, in so far as
it relates to the necessity of corporations appearing by attorney in litigation, nor
violative of any constitutional mandate. This provision, when added to the statute
in 1939, s did not effect a change in New York law,59 nor did it effect a departure
from the majority rule throughout the country. 60 While the law gives to a corporation an entity capable of suing and being sued,61 the entity is artificial and therefore cannot appear for itself.62 Since it is unlawful for any person other than an
attorney to appear for another person in legal proceedings, 63 requiring the same
qualification in regard to an agent of a corporation is no more burdensome.
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